The other day, in an online discussion, I posted a quote from W.H. Auden. According to some completely unverified website, Auden once said or wrote that “a real book is not one that we read, but one that reads us.” My original impression of the quote was that it conveyed the idea that in some way we get out of the book what we bring into it, but this obviously depends on what kind of book we are talking about. A few people objected to this quote immediately, arguing that Auden was saying no more than that there are books that he really likes, and that the same sentence would be as vague and nonsensical if other words were inserted instead of book.
Upon some reflection, I think that the objectors are correct to point out that Auden is just being too vague. I probably read too far into it at the beginning, based on some other stuff I’m reading/thinking about lately, and for this reason it’s always good to have some fresh eyes. However, I think the initial reason that I argued back instead of rethinking Auden’s quote was that I perceived them as trying to assert some kind of logical positivist argument that would render Auden’s statement meaningless. I decided not to go down that road, and instead argued for what I thought was a more charitable reading. And, frankly, I doubt that these objectors were ascribing to that very narrow discourse (although, no doubt, it’s possible that they were influenced by positivism in other ways).
I was reading through Vattimo’s pseudo-intellectual memoir Belief today, and Vattimo struck me as presenting a pretty well-reasoned defense of slightly imprecise language in arguments that is nonetheless rigorous. I think that whether you accept Vattimo’s argument will depend on your position towards metaphysics; clearly Vattimo is arguing the way he is because he attempts at post-metaphysical philosophy. These technical quibbles notwithstanding, I think Vattimo is on to something here, especially in the context of semi-academic blogging.
I am not saying that one should accept any statement no matter how vague and contradictory it may be. I am trying to propose arguments, which, even though they do not claim to be definite descriptions as they really are, seem to be reasonable interpretations of our condition here and now. The rigor of post-metaphysical discourse consists in the effort to cultivate an attitude of persuasion without proclaiming a “universal” viewpoint, which is no viewpoint at all, am attitude that is aware of coming from and addressing someone belonging to the same process, of which it has no neutral vision but risks an interpretation. In this case, a neutral reason is not only impossible, but literally senseless, as if one were to try to pull out one’s eyes in order to see things objectively.
Vattimo, Belief, Stanford UP, 1999. 46.
